SSC2 is a stream cipher that operates by X ORing the output of two half-ciphers". The rst half-cipher is constructed from a linear feedback shift register LFSR with a non-linear lter. The second half-cipher is constructed from a lagged Fibonacci generator LFG and a m ultiplexor that chooses values from the Fibonacci register. The second half-cipher has a small cycle length 2 52 . By XORing the key-stream at an interval of words, the e ects of the LFR half-cipher are cancelled, leaving only the XOR of outputs of the LFSR half-cipher. Fast correlation attacks can derive the initial state of the LFSR from around 2 25 words of this sequence using a few hours of computation. The output of the LFSR halfcipher is then removed from the key-stream, leaving the output of the LFR half-cipher. The initial state of the LFG is obtained by identifying when the multiplexor has selected speci c words in the LFG register this process typically takes around a second, using around 15300 outputs.
1 Introduction SSC2 is a stream cipher proposed by Zhang, Carroll and Chan 2 . The cipher is designed for software implementation and is very fast. This paper describes a practical cryptanalysis of SSC2 that requires around 2 25 words of known key-stream from a run of 2 52 words and a few hours work on a 250 MHz processor with 100 MB of memory.
SSC2 is based on a linear feedback shift register LFSR and a lagged Fibonacci generator LFG. An LFSR consists of a register that stores a set of bits called the state, and a function that is linear modulo 2. This function updates the state bit-by-bit. An LFG consists of a register which stores a set of integers modulo N once again called the state and a function that is linear modulo N. This function updates the state integer-by-integer. In SSC2, the modulus is N = 2 32 , and the integers are stored as 32-bit blocks called words. Previous Results. In the rump session of Crypto 2000, Rose and Hawkes 5 reported on correlations between the least signi cant bits LSBs of certain words output from SSC2.
They also noted that the LFG has a small period = 17 2 31 New Results. The rst part of the attack in this paper exploits the small period of the LFG by performing a fast correlation attack on the stream Z i , based on the correlation noted in 5 .
This part of the attack requires around 2 25 words of known key-stream from a run of 2 52 words with a few hours of processing time on a 250 MHz Sun UltraSPARC see Section 3. The attack applies simple techniques that increase the accuracy and speed of any fast correlation attack.
After the output of the LFSR half-cipher is removed, the attack identi es when the multiplexor has selected speci c words in the LFG register, and uses this information to reconstruct the initial state of the LFG Section 4. This part of the attack requires around 15300 known outputs of the LFG half-cipher presumed already known from the previous phase and around a second of processing on a 250 MHz Sun UltraSPARC.
A Description of SSC2
LFSR half-cipher. The LFSR state is stored in four 32-bit words x i+3 ; x i+2 ; x i+1 ; x i . The state is updated to x i+4 ; x i+3 ; x i+2 ; x i+1 b y computing x i+4 = x i+2 x i+1 31 x i 1;
where` ' denotes a zero-ll left shift and` ' denotes a zero-ll right shift. If this sequence were converted to a bit-stream b t , then the bit-sequence would satisfy the linear recursion:
The LFSR is implemented using a 4-word array S PLSBz i = lS i = 5=8. Note that this correlation is incorrectly presented in 1 . Intuitively, three of these terms are the bits that are XORed to form the least signi cant bits of N i ; the other two terms contribute to the carry bits that in uence how this result might be inverted or a ected by carry propagation. Obviously N i+ is similarly correlated to the state S i+ , but because the state update function is entirely linear, the bits of S i+ are in turn linear functions of the bits of S i . So Z i exhibits a correlation to LS i = lS i lS i+ . We will provide the full function LS in an Appendix .
The words of the LFSR state are updated according to a bitwise feedback polynomial, but since the wordsize 32 bits is a power of two, entire words of state also obey the recurrence relation, being related by the 32nd power of the feedback polynomial.
If the two streams z i and z i+ were independent, then the correlation probability w ould be PZ i = L i = 1 7 =32. However these streams are clearly not independent and, experimentally, we h a ve determined that there is a second order" e ect and in practice the error probability i s approximately 0.446, rather than the expected 0.46875. This fortuitous occurrence makes the fast correlation attack more e cient.
The attack on the LFSR half-cipher proceeds by rst gathering about 32,000,000 words Z i , of which only the least signi cant bits are utilised in the attack. This requires two segments of a single output stream, separated by . We then perform fast correlation calculations, to attempt to correct" the output stream, on di erent amounts of input varying between 29,000,000 bits and 32,000,000 bits. Empirically, about 2 3rds of these trials will terminate and produce the correct output LS; some of the trials might give an incorrect answer, while others will bog down", performing a large number of iterations without correcting a signi cant n umber of the remaining errors. The sections below describe the fast correlation attack itself in some detail.
If the attack is thought t o h a ve corrected the output, linear algebra is used to relate this back to the initial state S 0 . The sequence Z i = z i z i+ can be reconstructed from the initial state to verify that S 0 is correct. If S 0 is incorrect or the attack bogs down", then a di erent number of input bits will be tried. Thanks to the numerous optimisations discussed below, a single fast-correlation computation when successful takes about an hour on a 250MHz Sun
UltraSPARC not a particularly fast machine by today's standards and uses about 70MB of memory. When a computation bogs down" it is arbitrarily terminated after 1000 rounds, and this takes a few hours. For a particular output set, the full initial state is often recovered in as little as one hour, and it is very unlikely that the correct state will not be found within a day.
Increasing the Accuracy of Fast Correlation Attacks
The discussion below applies mostly to LFSRs with low w eight feedback, in particular where a trinomial feedback is in use.
A n umber of papers have been written since 8 applying heuristic techniques to speeding up or increasing the accuracy of the basic technique of fast correlation attacks. These include 3, 4, 7, 10 . We rst spent a lot of time examining some of these techniques, and variation in their probabilities, until enough bits had error probabilities exceeding some threshhold, or a predetermined number of iterations had been exceeded. We found the arguments in favour of performing iterations unsatisfying, since it seemed that the new probabilities were just selfreinforcing. Eventually, w e made structural changes to the program which made it impossible to do iterations, and found an overall increase in accuracy.
The basic correlation algorithm has the error probability P as an input parameter; P is kept constant throughout the computation, and the bit probabilities are reset to P at the beginning of each round. In reality, the error probabilities decrease with each round at least initially, so this approach results in inaccurate estimates for the bit probabilities. We found that as the real error probability approaches 0:5, then a constant v alue of P is unlikely to result in a successful attack. The computation is more likely to be successful if P is estimated at each round. For a given P, it is straightforward to calculate the proportion of parity c heck equations expected to be satis ed by the data. This process is easily reversible, too; having observed the proportion of parity c heck equations satis ed, it is easy to calculate the error probability P: 1 = 1 , 2 ; P = 1 2 1 , 1=3 :
Since each round begins by counting parity c heck equations, it is a simple matter to calculate P for that round. This technique essentially forbids the use of iterations, and obviates techniques like fast reset", but nevertheless speeds up the attack and increases the likelihood of success.
We felt that having the greatest possible number of parity c heck equations for each bit was important to the operation of the algorithm, so we performed a one-time brute force calculation to look for low-weight multiples of the feedback polynomial other than the obvious ones the powers of the basic polynomial. We found a numberofthem. and all possible powers of these polynomials. For each bit, the parity checks with that bit at the left, in the middle, and at the right, were all used. For 30,000,000 input bits, an average of 200 parity c heck equations applied to each bit.
Lastly, w e made the observation that relatively early in the computation, a signi cant n umber of bits satis ed all of the available parity c heck equations. We called these fully satis ed bits.
Experimentally we determined that when more than a few hundred such bits were available, and if the computation was eventually successful, they were almost all correct, so that any subset of 127 of them had a high probability of forming a linearly independent set of equations in the original state bits, which could then be solved in a straightforward manner. Computationally, taking this early opportunity to calculate the answer is a signi cant performance improvement.
In a typical run with 30,000,000 bits of input, 5,040 fully satis ed bits were available after 16 rounds, all of which turned out to becorrect, while the full computation required 64 rounds. This is not as great an optimisation as it sounds, because the rounds get faster as the number of bits corrected decreases see below.
Increasing the Speed of Fast Correlation Attacks
At the same time as we w ere analysing the theoretical basis for improvements in the algorithm,
we also looked at purely computational optimisations to the algorithm. When the probability o f error of individual bits is variable, probability computations are complex and require signi cant e ort for each bit, as well as the requirement to store oating-point numbers for each bit.
When the error probability P is assumed the same for all bits at the beginning of a round, the computation is signi cantly eased. More importantly, the likelihood that a particular bit is in error can be expressed as a threshhold of the numberofunsatis ed parity c heck equations,
given the total number of parity c heck equations for that bit, and the probability P.
The number of parity c heck equations available for a particular bit is least near the edges of the data set, and increases toward the middle. During the rst pass over the data, the numberof equations available for each bit is simply counted this is computationally irrelevant compared to actually checking the equations and the indexes where this total is di erent to that for the previous bit is stored. Thus, it requires very little memory to derive the total number of parity checks for a particular bit in subsequent passes. In each round, the rst pass over the data calculates and stores the number of unsatis ed checks for each bit. From the total proportion of parity checks unsatis ed, P is calculated for this round, and from that, threshhold values above which a bit will beconsidered to bein error are calculated for each numberof parity check equations. When P 0:4 it is approximately correct that more than half of the parity checks unsatis ed implies that the probability of the bit being erroneous is greater than 0.5, and the bit should be corrected. However, when P 0:4, more equations need to be unsatis ed before ipping a bit is theoretically justi ed. The algorithm's eventual success is known to be very dependent on these early decisions.
A pass is then made through the data, ipping the bits that require it. For each bit that is ipped, the count of unsatis ed parity c hecks is corrected, not only for that bit, but for each bit involved in a parity c heck equation with it. The correction factor is accumulated in a separate array so that the correction is applied to all bits e ectively simultaneously. Bits which have no unsatis ed parity c hecks are noted. In the early rounds, this incremental approach doesn't save very much, but as fewer bits are corrected per round the saving in computation becomes very signi cant.
Typically another 50 of the overall computation is then saved when the count of fully satis ed bits signi cantly exceeds the length of the register, and the answer is derived from linear algebra. The net e ect of the changes described in this and the previous section is a factor of some hundreds in the time required for data sets of about 100,000 bits over a straightforward implementation. We did not have time to nd the speedup for larger data sets, as it would have required too long to run the original algorithm. as such triples can be shown to satisfy i = i+12 = i+17 , with probability close to one. These triples are said to bevalid because i = i+12 = i+17 with probability close to one, which ful lls part of the requirement for a good pair. Note that the values i ; i+12 and i+17 must satisfy the relation: 
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that attacks on SSC2 are computationally feasible, given a su cient amount of key-stream. The amount of key-stream required is currently prohibitively large of the order of 2 52 , however, we suggest that the existence of this attack indicates that SSC2 is not su ciently secure for modern encryption requirements.
